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JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDING BELOW
This case involves an appeal of the trial court's holding (following a bifurcated
four-day trial) that the Rawlings family farm is held for the benefit of the Rawlings
family, and imposing a constructive trust upon Donald and Jeanette Rawlings.
Appellate jurisdiction is present pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j),
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 54(b).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Marshaling the Evidence
1. In making blanket assertions that 'no evidence' exists to support the trial court
findings, and in failing to comprehensively present all the evidence that supports the trial
court's ruling, and in failing to identify the 'fatal flaw' in the trial court's factual findings,
Appellants have failed to marshal the evidence. See West Valley City v. Majestic Inv.
Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). Failure to marshal the evidence allows a
court to dispose of the appeal on that issue alone. State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ]{60, 28
P.3d 1278.
Constructive Trust
2. The trial court was correct in imposing a constructive trust on Appellants
Donald and Jeanette Rawlings when the evidence is that Donald represented to the family
that he was holding the family farm for the benefit of the family, that all of the siblings
reposed in Donald and Jeanette trust that they were acting for the benefit of the family,
and when Donald and Jeanette made monetary disbursements to family members
consistent with that understanding. Appellants argue in their statement of issues that the
-1-

standard of review for matters of equity is a 'clearly preponderates' standard, based on
the case of In re Estate of Hock. In actuality, that holding in In re Estate of Hock has
been overruled. The proper standard of review for matters both in equity and at law is a
'clearly erroneous' standard. RHNCorp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, f35, 96 P.3d. 935.
Statute of Limitations
3. The trial court was correct in finding that the discovery rule tolled the statute of
limitations. As a matter of equity, evidence of facts sufficient to raise the discovery rule
is a finding of fact that is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. In re Hoopiiaina
Trust, 2006 UT 53,1J37, 44 P.3d 1129.
Sanctions
4. The trial court was correct in imposing sanctions on the Appellants Donald and
Jeanette Rawlings when they failed to mediate in good faith.

Sanction orders are

reviewed for abuse of discretion. Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, ^[35, 71 P.3d
601.
STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS
DETERMINATIVE ON APPEAL
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED

§ 78-3 lb-5(2)

The rules of the Judicial Council shall be based upon the
purposes and provisions of this act. Any procedural and
evidentiary rules as the Supreme Court may adopt shall not
impinge on the constitutional rights of any parties.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED

§ 78-31b-5(3)(p)

to authorize imposition of sanction for failure of counsel or
parties to participate in good faith in the ADR procedure
assigned;
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UTAH RULES OF COURT-ANNEXED ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, RULE 101(C)

The mediation conference shall commence at the place, date,
and time agreed upon by the mediator and the parties. All
parties shall be present, shall be prepared to discuss, and shall
have authority to fully settle, all relevant issues in the case.
The mediator shall conduct the mediation conference and
determine the length and timing of sessions and recesses, and
the order and manner of presentation of the issues. The
mediation conference should proceed in a fashion that
furthers the goals of the mediation process, preserves
confidentiality, and encourages candor on the part of
participating parties. The mediator should serve as a neutral
facilitator, assisting the parties in defining and narrowing the
issues and encouraging each party to examine the dispute
from various perspectives, without undertaking to decide any
issue, make findings of fact, or impose any agreement.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The present case involves a dispute between siblings over the family farm,
comprised of fruit orchards and livestock. In 1944, the father, Arnold Rawlings acquired
the property in question from his mother. (See Trial Exhibit 3). Until 1967, Arnold had
title to the property in his name. Id. The property has never been in the name of
Arnold's wife, Cleo Rawlings. (See Trial Exhibit 3, Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 52:1516, 280:14-16).

By October of 1966 Arnold had been diagnosed with cancer and

required a substantial amount of medical care, including expensive cobalt treatments.
(Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 45:20-25, 46:1-9, 47:5-13, 63:24-25, 64:1-23, 133:16-22).
These expenses threatened to consume Arnold's estate, i.e. the farm.

(Record 1451,

Trans. Vol. I, 134:2-10). In order to avoid losing the farm, Arnold was advised by the
welfare department to transfer the farm out of his name. (See Trial Exhibit 68). In
March of 1967 Arnold disclosed to two of his sons, Dwayne Rawlings and LaRell
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Rawlings, that he planned to transfer the farm to the eldest son, Donald Rawlings, to hold
the farm for the benefit of Arnold and the family. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 48:20-25,
49:1-25, 50:1-25, 51:1-24, 134:2-16, Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 224:2-5, 333:9-25,
334:1-10, 335:23-25, 336:1-2, 381:4-15, 388:20-25, 389:1-5). Donald was present at
these discussions and indicated that he would follow the plan, and hold the farm for the
family. Id.

On March 24, 1967, the farm was transferred into Donald's name, along

with that of his wife, Jeanette. (See Trial Exhibit 14). Although before the transfer, the
farm was solely in Arnold's name, Arnold asked all of his children and their spouses to
sign the 1967 deed. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 63:6-23, Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II,
247:2-10, 336:1-19). After the 1967 transfer, Arnold continued to work the farm and
refer to it as "his" farm. (See Trial Exhibits 19-29, Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 63:19-23,
191:3-18, Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 229:23-25, 233:21-25, 234:1, 238:9-12, 252:1023, 338:16-25, 339:1-22).

LaRell continued to help his father market the fruit in

Wyoming. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 99:2-25, 100:1-6). Prior to Arnold's death,
Bryce Rawlings (the fourth son), moved into a trailer on the farm. (Record 1459, Trans.
Vol. II, 248:6-20). Bryce continued to live there fore four to five years after Arnold's
death. Id. After Arnold Rawlings died, on March 30, 1971 Cleo, Arnold's widow, paid
the taxes on the farm. (Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 280:14-16). All of the siblings
(except Donald ironically) continued to labor on the farm. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I,
63:19-23, 66:3-8, 129:9-19, 130:2-11, Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 238:9-12, 254:1-10,
338:16-25, 339:1-22).

In 1974, a boundary dispute with the development Vinyard

Meadows arose on the southern border of the farm. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 104:924, Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 255:20-25, 256:1-16, 298:19-25, 299:1, 344:1-25, 345:1-4-

25, 346:1-25, 347:1-21). Donald required his siblings and mother to sign an additional
quit claim deed to clear up some purported fault in the title so that he could properly
prosecute litigation against Vinyard Meadows on behalf of the family.

Id.

After

successful litigation against Vinyard Meadows, Donald distributed proceeds from the
judgment award to his siblings and his mother, thereby acknowledging his role of holding
the farm for the benefit of the family. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 162:2-7, Record
1459, Trans. Vol. II, 239:22-25, 240:1-17, 255:20-24, 290:21-25, 291:1-3, 351:1-25,
352:1-19). In 1978, Donald and Jeanette, and Dwayne and Paulette, traded a small part
of the farm ("the Pinegar lot") for another piece of land referred to as the 'industrial
property.' (Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 349:9-25, 350:12-22). Immediately before this
trade, Donald and Jeanette also deeded, without consideration, a half interest in the
Pinegar lot to Dwayne and Paulette Rawlings. Id.

Donald and Dwayne operated a top

soil business on the farm property, and reserved surplus profits for the benefit of the
family. (Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 354:24-25, 355:1-6). Throughout the following
years, the siblings continued to work the farm and give the proceeds of fruit sales to their
mother, Cleo. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 63:19-23, 66:3-8, 129:9-19, 130:2-11, Record
1459, Trans. Vol. II, 238:9-12, 254:1-10, 338:16-25, 339:1-22). Finally, in March of
1993, Donald sold two lots off of the farm and purchased property located near St.
George, Utah ("the Hellwell trade"). (See Trial Exhibit 48). The siblings had no notice
of this trade until the late summer of 1993, but when they learned of it, they understood
that Donald was still acting for the benefit of the family. (Record 1459., Trans. Vol. II,
355:7-25, 356:1-25, 357:1-11, Record 1461, Trans. Vol. Ill, 453:7-25, 454:1-7). In late
October or early November of 1993, Dwayne and Donald had a conversation in which
-5-

Donald indicated for the first time that he was holding the farm for himself and
repudiated the trust. Id. The resulting disagreements over Donald's repudiation of the
trust and disputes over the top soil business led to the disintegration of Donald and
Dwayne's business and litigation ensued.

Id.

Three and a half years after the

repudiation, Dwayne and his siblings filed a counterclaim against Donald, alleging
constructive trust.

(Record 23-38).

After several pretrial motions and a lengthy

discovery period, the trial court bifurcated the case. The initial part of the trial would
address the issue of the existence of a constructive trust. The remaining causes of action
between the parties, and the issue of damages on constructive trust, were reserved for the
second part of the trial. On May 17, 2006, the District Court ordered mediation with
Judge Burningham, in attempt to resolve the issues. (Record 1267). In mediation,
Donald and Jeanette refused to consider the issues in the case, and refused to make any
offers or consider any offers from the opposing parties. (Record 1295). Subsequently,
the trial court imposed sanctions for failure to mediate in good faith. (Record 1403). The
first half of the trial addressing the imposition of a constructive trust went forward on
March 12 through March 15, 2007. (Record 1449-67). The District Court ruled on May
24, 2007, imposing a constructive trust, and entered a Rule 54(b) certification on that
issue. (Record 1540, 1583). Appellants seek review of the imposition of the constructive
trust, and review of the imposition of sanctions for failure to mediate in good faith.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case presents several challenges to the trial court's findings of fact. The
standard of review for all findings of fact, regardless of the burden of proof at the trial
court level, is a clearly erroneous standard. Appellants' assertion that the standard of
-6-

review should be a 'clearly preponderates' standard is based on cases that are no longer
good law.
In challenging the existence of a confidential relationship, Appellants have failed
to meet their burden of marshalling the evidence in the record to support the District
Court's findings.

That failure alone requires a ruling against the Appellants.

The

testimony and documentation strongly support the existence of a confidential
relationship. Moreover, neither the trial court nor the Appellees limited themselves to a
finding of a constructive trust based only on a confidential relationship. The existence of
a confidential relationship is not required in order to properly impose a constructive trust,
and the evidence properly supports the imposition of a constructive trust under alternate
theories not raised in this appeal.
Appellants also argue that the statute of limitations was not properly applied to the
facts of this case, but in doing so Appellants have again failed to meet their burden of
marshaling the evidence. In cases of constructive trusts between family members who
repose trust in each other (which is the case here) the discovery rule exception to the
statute of limitations presumptively applies.

Once the discovery rule applies, the

remaining question is whether and when did the beneficiaries of the trust have notice of
repudiation. The uncontroverted evidence is that Appellees had notice of repudiation no
sooner than the fall of 1993, well within any applicable statute of limitations.
Finally, Utah rules and statutes permit a trial court to impose sanctions on parties
that fail to mediate in good faith and the trial court properly found lack of good faith and
appropriately imposed sanctions on Appellants.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ALL FINDINGS OF FACT,
REGARDLESS OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF AT THE TRIAL
COURT LEVEL, IS A "CLEARLY ERRONEOUS* STANDARD.

Appellants Donald and Jeanette Rawlings (hereinafter "Donald and Jeanette") argue in
their issues presented for review that when the burden of proof in the trial court is a clear
and convincing evidence standard, then the standard of review for factual findings on
appeal is a "clearly preponderates" standard. (See Appellants' Brief, pages 1-2). This
legal principle and the supporting case law cited by Donald tad Jeanette have since been
overturned and is no longer good law. Appellants' reliance on In re Estate of Hock is
misplaced and erroneous. In RHN Corp. v. Veibell the Utah Supreme Court clarified that
the standard of review for all factual findings is a "clearly erroneous" standard. 2004 UT
60, f35, 96 P.3d 935.
While it is settled that in cases at law, an appellate court will
review a trial court's findings of fact under a clearly
erroneous standard, in cases in equity, some confusion still
exists over the proper standard of review for a trial court's
findings of fact. In equity cases, appellate courts have often
applied a clear preponderance standard. Nevertheless, there
is also a recent trend in equity cases to review findings of fact
under the clearly erroneous standard. . . . In the interests of
simplicity, therefore, we hold that the proper standard of
review for a trial court's findings of fact for cases in equity is
the same as for cases at law, namely the clearly erroneous
standard.
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); See also Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT
22, f23, 112 P.3d 495. "A finding is clearly erroneous if it is against the great weight of
the evidence or if the court is otherwise definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake
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has been made." Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989). This standard
applies to all of the findings of fact on this appeal. Although some questions of law may
be at issue, this appeal deals primarily with the factual findings of the trial court and the
appropriate application of the law to these facts. In other words, this appeal is a case of
questions of fact and mixed questions of fact and law. In both circumstances, the
appropriate standard of review is a clearly erroneous standard and not the 'clearly
preponderates' standard proposed by Donald and Jeanette. The 'clearly preponderates5
standard no longer has application in Utah.
II.

IN CHALLENGING THE EXISTENCE OF A CONFIDENTIAL
RELATIONSHIP, APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO MEET THEIR
BURDEN OF MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE, AND THERE IS
ABUNDANT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE
DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS.
A.

Donald and Jeanette have not met their burden of marshaling the
evidence.

Under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "a party challenging a fact finding must
first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." UTAH R. APP. P.
24(a)(9). This requirement only applies to an appellant's challenges to "factual findings,
not to conclusions of law." Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corporation, 2004 UT 28, ]|37, 94
P.3d 193 (quoting Pierce v. Pierce, 2000 UT 1, \\1 n.4, 994 P.2d 193). This Court has
clearly outlined a two-part burden placed on an appellant challenging findings of fact.
First,
[c]ounsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's
shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order to
properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial
which supports the very findings the appellant resists.
-9-

West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991) (emphasis
added). Second,
[a]fter constructing this magnificent array of supporting
evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the
evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to
convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting
upon the evidence is clearly erroneous.
Id. The appellant must show that the evidence when viewed "in a light most favorable to
the trial court's ruling is insufficient to support the trial court's findings."

State v.

Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ^60, 28 P.3d 1278 (quoting State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ^}17
n.2, 1 P.3d 1108) (internal quotation marks, emphasis, and citations omitted).

An

appellant must demonstrate that the deficiency in the trial court's findings is "against the
clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous." In re Estate of
Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (internal quotation njiarks and citations omitted).
It is insufficient, in meeting their burden, for an appellant to "merely re-argue the factual
case they presented in the trial court." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f77, 100 P.3d 1177
(internal citation omitted).
An appellants failure to meet this burden "allows [the appellate court] to affirm the
[trial] court's findings on that basis alone." Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ^[60. It is not the
duty of the Court of Appeals to "review the trial court's findings where the party
challenging those facts fails to marshal the evidence." Eggett, 2004 UT 28, ^[10 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, |24, 973 P.2d 431).
Rather, upon an appellant's failure to marshal, the appellate court "must assume that the
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record supports the findings of the trial court." Eggett, 2004 UT 28, ^flO (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Additionally, where an appellant asserts that there is no evidence in the record, the
burden of marshaling the evidence will not shift to the appellee. Wilson Supply, Inc. v.
Fradan Manufacturing Corp., 2002 UT 94, ^[22, 54 P.3d 1177. In order to overcome a
'no evidence' assertion, an appellee "need only point to a scintilla of credible evidence
from the record that supports finding in order to overcome the appellant's 'no evidence'
assertion and to demonstrate that the appellant has failed to meet its marshaling burden."
Id.
In the present case Donald and Jeanette have repeatedly asserted that there is no
evidence to support the trial court's findings. Appellants have stated in their Brief that
there was a "complete absence of. . . any evidence" of a confidential relationship. (See
Brief of Appellants, page 8). Elsewhere, Donald and Jeanette assert that there was "no
evidence offered . . . that they were in a confidential relationship."

(See Brief of

Appellants, page 9).
Having asserted that there is 'no evidence' to support the trial court's ruling,
Donald and Jeanette make no attempt to marshal the evidence which they allege does not
exist. Although Appellees need only point to a 'scintilla' of evidence in support of a
confidential relationship in order to overcome Donald and Jeanette's sweeping assertions,
much more than a scintilla of evidence exists in the record.
In the numerous findings of the trial court, Donald and Jeanette fail to designate or
address those findings which they assert are insufficient. Moreover, they fail to marshal
the evidence which supports these findings and they fail to raise the purported flaw
-11-

claimed to be fatal to these findings. In doing so, Donald ^nd Jeanette have cast on the
Appellees and the Court the burden of searching the voluminous record to ascertain
which findings they are challenging, and the evidence supporting them. In West Valley
City this burden is explicitly imposed upon appellants. Donald and Jeanette have ignored
their marshaling burden and this failure is fatal to their appea^.
B. There is abundant evidence in the record to support the trial court's
finding of a confidential relationship.
A confidential relationship arises when one party gains the trust and confidence of
the other and then exercises influence over that party. Estate of loupe, 878 P.2d 1168,
1174 (Utah App. 1994). In order to find that a confidential relationship exists, a court
must weigh a number of factors.

Specifically, "[i]f by reason of kinship, business

association, disparity in age, or physical or mental condition or other reason one party is
in an especially intimate position with regard to the other, and the latter reposes a high
degree of trust and confidence in the former, the court may find that the relationship is
technically 'confidential.'" Hawkins v. Perry, 253 P.2d 372, 376 (Utah 1953) (internal
punctuation and citation omitted). "While kinship may be a factor in determining the
existence of a legally significant confidential relationship, there must be a showing, in
addition to the kinship, a reposal of confidence by one partv and the resulting superiority
and influence on the other party." Estate of Jones v. Jones, 759 P.2d 345, 347-48 (Utah
App. 1988) (citation omitted) rev'd on other grounds by Matter of Estate of Jones, 858
P.2d 983 (Utah 1993); See also loupe, 878 P.2d at 1174. When it is shown that, 1) a
party transferred certain property to another with the verbal understanding that the latter
hold the property in trust for the benefit of the whole family, 2) that the transferor

-12-

reposed confidence in the transferee, and 3) that the transferor and the transferee were
close relations, such as parent and child, then such evidence is sufficient to establish a
confidential relationship. Haws v. Jensen, 209 P.2d 229, 232 (Utah 1949); Walker v.
Walker, 404 P.2d 253, 257 (Utah 1965). The existence of a confidential relationship is a
question of fact. loupe, 878 P.2d at 1174; Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah
1978).
In the present case there is substantial evidence that the parties are closely related
by kinship, that Arnold transferred the farm to Donald and Jeanette with the
understanding that they would hold the family farm for the benefit of the family, that the
family reposed confidence in Donald and Jeanette that they would hold the family farm
for the benefit of the family, and that Donald exercised influence over the family
members. It must be remembered that Arnold Rawlings was suffering from cancer
(eventually terminal) and was under heavy cobalt treatments. Consequently, he was
under great stress to get the farm out of his name. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 45:20-25,
46:1-9, 47:5-13, 63:24-25, 64:1-23, 133:16-22, 134:2-10). LaRell Rawlings, Donald's
brother, testified that his father Arnold told LaRell that he wanted to get the farm out of
his name so that he could qualify for government assistance due to his medical needs.1
Id. Arnold initially wanted to put the farm in LaRell's name, since he was doing most of
the work on the farm. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 48:11-25, 49:1-25, 50:1-25, 51:1-3).
LaRell suggested, instead, that Arnold put the farm in Dwayne's name, feeling that

1

Arnold had been diagnosed with cancer. Arnold was specifically instructed by the
welfare department to transfer the farm out of his name so that he could qualify for
benefits that would cover the costs of his medical treatment. (See Trial Exhibit 68).
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Dwayne would be fairest to the family. Id. Arnold finally settled on Donald as the
person who would hold the farm for the benefit of the family, he being the oldest son.
(Record 1449, Trans. Vol. I, page 48, lines 20-25; page 49, lines 1-25; page 50, lines 125; page 51, lines 1-24; page 177, lines 18-25; page 178, line 1). LaRell testified,
"[W]hen I and my ex-wife Arlene went down to sign [the deed], Dad told me, he says
'This is not Donald's property. This is the family's.' He told me that before I signed it.
I didn't ask him that; he told me that." (Record 1449, Trahs. Vol. I, 60:8-12). LaRell
further testified that his father and the rest of the family, including Donald, continued to
treat the farm as family property, and to run the farm as a family farm, not as Donald's
farm.

(Record 1449, Trans. Vol. I, 63:19-23, 66:3-8, 129:9-19, 130:2-11).

The

understanding was that the proceeds from the farm would continue to benefit Arnold,
Cleo (the mother) and the rest of the family. (Record 1449, Trans. Vol. I, 182:23-25,
184:16-23, 191:3-18). LaRell testified:
Q. At the time did you believe that Donald would do what
your father told you was to be done with the farm?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. At that time you trusted that he would do that?
A. Yes, I did.
(Record 1449, Trans. Vol. I, 127:19-25, 128:1-3).
Bryce Rawlings offered similar testimony to that of LaRell. He testified that
Donald and Arnold approached Bryce, informed him that the farm needed to be taken out
of Arnold's name, and that Donald would hold the farm for the benefit of the family.
(Record 1451, Trans. Vol. II, 224:2-5, 238:4-8). In addition, the children continued to
work the farm, and the farm continued to be treated as a family asset. (Record 1451,
Trans. Vol. II, 229:23-25, 233:21-25, 234:1, 238:9-12, 248:6-20, 252:10-23, 254:1-10).
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Proceeds from the farm went to Arnold and Cleo. Id. Bryce further indicated that
Donald exercised influence over the family in that he managed the legal affairs of the
farm and dealt with legal disputes. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. II, 255:20-25, 256:1-16,
298:19-25, 299:1). The proceeds of these legal disputes were distributed to both siblings
and parent, with the understanding that all of the family was entitled 1o the proceeds,
because Donald was holding the farm in trust for the family. Id. Such distribution would
not have been necessary if Donald had not been holding the farm for the benefit of the
family.
Dwayne Rawlings also offered evidence of a confidential relationship.

He

testified that Arnold and Donald approached him on the driveway of Arnold's house, and
explained the medical situation and the need to get the farm out of Arnold's name.
(Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 333:9-25, 334:1-10, 381:4-15, 388:20-25, 389:1-5. Arnold
specifically told Dwayne, in the presence of Donald, "that they had to get it out of Dad's
name, and they were going to put it in Donald's name to hold it for the rest of the
family." (Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 333:21-23). Arnold told Dwayne that the farm
would be divided up between the family members at a later time. (Record 1459, Trans.
Vol. II, 335:23-25, 336:1-2). Further, Donald exercised influence and deceit over the
family in that, when managing a boundary dispute, he falsely represented to the family
that additional deeds were required to perfect his title before he could proceed with
litigation on behalf of the family. (Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 346:10-22, 352:9-19,
398:3-7, Record 1461, Trans. Vol. Ill, 430:11-21). Throughout the years the family
trusted Donald and followed his lead both in terms of legal issues and in finances.
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(Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 396:11-25, Record 1461, Tran?. Vol. Ill, 420:10-20, 421:120,430:11-21,462:3-13).
Citing Jewell v. Horner, Donald and Jeanette assert that neither a confidential
relationship nor a constructive trust can be established by oply 'self-serving' testimony.
(See Appellants' Brief, page 10). While such argument m[ight have some merit if the
only evidence supporting the trial court's imposition of a constructive trust were the selfserving testimony of the siblings, the trial court had much more than sibling testimony on
which to base its conclusions.

There is ample evidence outside the testimony of

interested parties which both substantiates and independently establishes propriety of
imposing a constructive trust. Several letters and affidavits written three years after the
transfer, both by Arnold, and by associates of his who were prominent in the community,
substantiate the testimony. These letters were written after the transfer of the title of the
farm to Donald, and yet, Arnold refers to the farm as "my farm" and repeatedly asserts
and implies ownership and control. (See Trial Exhibits 19, 20). Arnold's associates do
the same. (See Trial Exhibits 21-29). After Arnold's death, Cleo continued to pay the
taxes on the farm, not Donald. (Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 280:14-16).
Next, Donald sold a portion of the farm and purchased some commercial property
from the proceeds of the sale upon which he and Dwayne operated a business. (Record
1459, Trans. Vol. II, 349:9-25, 350:12-22, 354:24-25, 355:1-6). The brothers recognized
that surplus proceeds of this business were to be held for thp benefit of the family.

Id.

The record shows that Donald deeded Dwayne a one half interest in a small portion of the
farm (known as the Pinegar lot) which was subsequently traded for some commercial
property to start a business.

Donald deeded this half interest to Dwayne without
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receiving or requiring any remuneration in return. Id. Such actions further substantiate
that the farm and its derivatives were family assets, not Donald's assets.
Furthermore, both Donald and Jeanette, against their own interest, failed to rebut
any of the testimony given in support of a confidential relationship. Before trial Donald
and Jeanette had asserted that they had paid off a small amount of back taxes and in
return, Arnold had deeded them the entire farm. (Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 333:1-25,
334:1-4). At trial, however, it was shown that Dwayne had paid the majority of these
back taxes, and that he had done so on behalf of the family. (Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II,
392:7-25). In addition, Donald did not rebut or dispute the testimony concerning his
presence during both the conversation with Dwayne, Arnold and himself, and the
conversation with LaRell, Arnold and himself. The uncontroverted testimony in regard
to those conversations was that Donald indicated that he would hold the farm for the
benefit of the family. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 48:20-25, 49:1-25, 50:1-25, 51:1-24,
52:21-25, 53:1-4, 60:8-12, 134:2-16, Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 224:2-5, 238:9-12,
333:9-25, 334:1-10, 335:23-25, 336:1-2, 381:4-15, 388:20-25, 389:1-5). Donald had
ample opportunity to rebut this testimony, since he also was at the meetings, but he did
not, thereby indicating that the testimony was truthful. Moreover, the uncontroverted
evidence is that after settlement of the border dispute, Donald distributed some of the
proceeds to the family, thereby indicating that he was holding for the benefit of the
family. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 162:2-7, Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 239:22-25,
240:1-17, 255:20-24, 290:21-25, 291:1-3, 351:1-25, 352:1-19). In sum, there is much
more evidence than just the testimony of all three siblings to substantiate the existence of
a confidential relationship and the imposition of a constructive trust.
-17-

All of this evidence should make it clear that th^re was much more than a
'scintilla' of evidence to support the trial court's finding of a confidential relationship.
Furthermore, the abundance of evidence on this issue is definitive; the trial court's ruling
was not clearly erroneous.
It should be noted that the evidence cited here is not comprehensive, but merely a
sample of the evidence presented to the trial court in support of a confidential relationship
and a constructive trust. Appellees are not under the saine obligation as Donald and
Jeanette are to marshal all of the evidence in favor of the ruling before articulating why
the ruling was clearly erroneous. Appellees must merely show that a 'scintilla' of
evidence exists to support the trial court's findings.
It is also noteworthy that Donald and Jeanette have permanently lost the
opportunity to marshal the evidence. They cannot try to marshal in a reply brief because
that would not afford Appellees the opportunity to rebut. Coleman ex rel Schefski v.
Stevens, 2000 UT 98, ^[9, 17 P.3d 1122; See also Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah,
2001UT75,31P.3d543.
III.

THE EXISTENCE OF A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP IS NOT
REQUIRED IN ORDER TO PROPERLY IMPOSE A CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUST.

Donald and Jeanette argue that in the absence of the existence of a confidential
relationship, no constructive trust can be imposed. (See Appellants' Brief, pages 8-9).
This is legally incorrect. A court sitting in equity can impose a constructive trust when
equity so demands; a court is not limited only to a confidential relationship theory. "A
constructive trust is an equitable remedy to prevent unjust enrichment in the absence of
any express or any implied intention to form a trust." Tollman v. Winchester Hills Water
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Company, Inc., 912 P.2d 457, 462 (Utah App. 1996); See also Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d
147, 150 (Utah 1987).
[N]either § 44 of the Restatement of Trusts nor this Court's
statement (above) in the Nielson decision constitutes an
exclusive definition of constructive trusts and exhausts the
possible circumstances under which a trust such as this may
be imposed. . . . An attempt to define or describe a
constructive trust would be inadequate because such
definition or description would be too narrow in its scope and
fail to include important types of constructive trusts.
Parks v. Zion's First National Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 598 (Utah 1983) (interaal punctuation
and citations omitted, emphasis added).
Constructive trusts include all those instances in which a trust
is raised by the doctrines of equity for the purpose of working
out justice in the most efficient manner, where there is no
intention of the parties to create such a relation, and in most
cases contrary to the intention of the one holding the legal
title, and where there is no express or implied, written or
verbal declaration of the trust.
Id. at 599 (emphasis added). Although the circumstances under which a constructive
trust may arise are intentionally undefined, courts have given some guidance as to some
circumstances that are seen more often than others. A constructive trust usually arises
when one unjustly profits through fraud, or when there is a violation of a duty arising
under a fiduciary or confidential relationship. Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708,
710 (Utah 1977); Close v. Adams, 657 P.2d 1351, 1353 (Utah 1983).

When the

constructive trust is predicated on a fraud, there must be a nexus between the fraud and
the property that is the target of the constructive trust. Lakeside Lumber Products, Inc. v.
Evans, 2005 UT App 87,1J15, 110 P.3d 154.
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In the present case, the Appellees have not exclusively relied upon a confidential
relationship theory to support the constructive trust. The Appellees in this case have pled
constructive trust and do not rely solely on one metho4 or theory for imposing a
constructive trust. The facts, as presented at trial, easily support an imposition of a
constructive trust under multiple other theories, including fraud, or a more general form
of pure equity.
Under the fraud question, evidence was presented at trial which showed that
Donald specifically deceived his siblings in regard to the 1974 deed and the Vinyard
Meadows litigation. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 104:9-24, Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II,
255:20-25, 256:1-16, 298:19-25, 299:1, 346:10-22, 350:12-22, 352:9-19, 352:24-25,
353:1-12, 398:3-7, Record 1461, Trans. Vol. Ill, 430:11-21). That alone is sufficient to
support a finding of constructive trust. The District Court stated that it considered
the admitted treatment of the farm by Arnold as a family farm
after the conveyance; the evidence of the welfare letter on
December 16, 1966; the continued statements by Arnold; his
solicitation of various letters from persons with whom he was
acquainted nearly three years later; the affidavits by Arnold
asserting that the farm was "his" farm and he needed help to
run it, the payment of taxes by Dwayne after the conveyance
to Donald; the payment of taxes in 1971 by Clep; the work on
the farm by family members with irrigating, harvesting, and
marketing fruit, as well as handling horses, with the proceeds
of the harvest being given to their mother Cleo; the placement
of a house trailer on the property by Bryce Rawlings prior to
Arnold's death; the request that family members sign a quitclaim deed to clear up a southern boundary dispute with the
Vinyard Meadows subdivision; the payment by Donald of
part of those proceeds to his siblings; the conveyance of a half
interest in the Pinegar lot to Dwayne to purchase the
industrial property; and the setting aside of fujids for Cleo's
burial and the payment to her for the purchase of a car. . . .
Such evidence as reviewed in the totality of the circumstances
supports the imposition of a constructive trust.
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(Record 1532-33). This evidence is sufficient to sustain a constructive trust on any
number of theories, including a confidential relationship, fraud, or as a matter of pure
equity. However, because the Donald and Jeanette have only challenged the imposition
of a constructive trust under a confidential relationship theory, the imposition of a
constructive trust under any other theory has not been raised on appeal.
IV.

IN CHALLENGING THE FINDING THAT THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS WAS TOLLED DUE TO A LACK OF REPUDIATION
OF THE TRUST, APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO MEET THEIR
BURDEN OF MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE, AND THERE WAS
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE DISTRICT COURT'S
FINDINGS.
A. Donald and Jeanette have again failed to meet their burden of
marshaling the evidence.
To reiterate, the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure state that "a party challenging

a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding."
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. With regard to the factual findings
undergirding the statute of limitations findings, Donald and Jeanette were under the
obligation to present in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence and then ferret out some fatal flaw from this 'magnificent array' of evidence
that is sufficient to undermine the trial court's findings. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at
1315. Merely re-arguing the factual case presented at trial is insufficient. Chen, 2004
UT 82, *fll. In the case at bar, not only have Donald and Jeanette failed to marshal the
evidence, they have even failed to reargue the factual case. Terse conclusory statements,
devoid of evidentiary references, are all that is provided. This deficiency is because
evidence is lacking. The Court will search the record in vain to find evidence which
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adequately rebuts the trial court's findings that the statute of limitations was tolled until
Appellees had notice of Donald and Jeanette's repudiation of the trust. Regardless of any
purported deficiencies in the evidence, an appellant's failure to marshal the evidence
"allows [the appellate court] to affirm the [trial] court's findings on that basis alone."
Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ]f60. Upon an appellant's failure to marshal, the appellate court
"must assume that the record supports the findings of the trial court." Eggett, 2004 UT
28,110.
In the present case, Donald and Jeanette have made iio attempts to marshal the
evidence in favor of the trial court's findings. In addressing the statute of limitations
issue, Donald and Jeanette immediately begin citing cases and presenting facts in support
of their legal arguments regarding the statute of limitations. No attempt whatsoever is
made to present facts supporting the trial court's findings. Appellants seem to rest such
claimed error solely on the passage of time. Furthermore, Donald and Jeanette are barred
from marshaling the evidence in their reply brief because that would not afford the
Appellees an opportunity to respond. Coleman, 2000 UT 98, f9; Gildea, 2001 UT 75.
Given Appellants complete failure to marshal the evidence oti ttie issue of the statute of
limitations, the Court should affirm the trial court's findings oji that basis alone.
B. The trial court found, based on substantial evidence, that the statute of
limitations was tolled, due to Donald and Jeanette's lack of repudiation
of the trust.
Statute of limitations issues in constructive trust actions are complicated. Being a
creature of equity, the constructive trust requires the trial court to consider all the
evidence before it can rule on the issue. This is true for two reasons. First, the statute of
limitations for a constructive trust is not defined by statute, thereby making it difficult to
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determine which statute applies to the particular circumstance. Second, in constructive
trust cases, and especially those involving family members, there is a presumption that
the 'discovery rule' tolls the statute of limitations until discovery of repudiation of the
trust. Answering these two questions requires factual findings, which generally have to
be resolved at trial. The District Court directly acknowledged this issue at the outset of
the case. (Record 259-260).
As to the first issue, in the present case it may be argued that it is unclear whether
the four-year catch-all provision found in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25 applies, or
whether, because this case directly involves real estate, the seven-year real estate statute
found in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-6 applies. Fortunately, the uncontradicted evidence
is that Donald and Jeanette first repudiated the trust (to Dwayne only) in early November
of 1993. (Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 355:7-25, 356:1-25, 357:1-11; Record 1461,
Trans. Vol. Ill, 453:7-25, 454:1-7). Three and a half years later, Appellees filed their
claim for constructive trust. (Record 24). Therefore, regardless of which statute of
limitations applies, Appellees filed within the appropriate time period.
As to the second issue, the discovery rule is an equitable doctrine which tolls the
statute of limitations when a person lacks knowledge of the facts giving rise to a cause of
action.
While a statute of limitations generally begins running when a
plaintiff has a completed cause of action, the discovery rule
may nonetheless operate to toll a statute of limitations until
the time at which a party discovered or reasonably should
have discovered facts forming the basis for the cause of
action.
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In re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53, f35, 144 P.3d 1129 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); Christiansen v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2006 UT App 180, ^12, 136 P.3d
1266.
[T]here are two situations in which an equitable discovery
rule will operate to toll a statute of limitatioris: (1) where a
plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action
because of the defendant's concealment or misleading
conduct, and (2) where the case presents exceptional
circumstances and the application of the genepl rule would
be irrational or unjust.
Hoopiiaina, 2006 UT 53, f 35 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under the
concealment prong of the discovery rale the claimant must demonstrate that "he neither
discovered nor reasonably should have discovered the facts underlying the cause of
action before the limitations period expired due to the defendant's concealment." Id. at
1J36. When such a factual circumstance is established, the "statute of limitations will not
commence running until the date the plaintiff possessed actual or constructive knowledge
of the facts forming the basis of his or her cause of actipn." Id. (internal citations
omitted).
Furthermore, in cases involving families and constructive trusts, the discovery rule
presumptively applies.
[W]hen a case involves a trust, a trustee cannot take
advantage of a statute of limitations defense until something
has occurred to give the beneficiary a "clear indication" that a
breach or repudiation has occurred, or, alternatively, the
circumstances must be such that the beneficiary must be
charged with knowledge of such a repudiation or breach.
Snow v. Rudd, 2000 UT 20, ^[11, 998 P.2d 262 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). A statute of limitations defense "is not available to a trustee as against his
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beneficiaries until something has occurred to give a clear indication to them that he has
repudiated his trust; or the circumstances are such that they must be charged with
knowledge of such repudiation." Walker v. Walker, 404 P.2d 253, 257 (Utah 1965); See
also Snow, 2000 UT 20, ]fl 1. Although a court would normally conduct a balancing test
to determine whether the discovery rule should apply, "[i]n the category of cases
involving beneficiaries' claims of trustee misconduct, [a court has], in effect, already
conducted this balancing test." Snow, 2000 UT 20, Tfl 1.
Good public policy undergirds the presumptive application of the discovery rule to
cases involving familial relations and constructive trusts. The case of Walker v. Walker is
particularly on point. 404 P.2d 253 (Utah 1965). In Walker, the father of the family died
much earlier than did the mother, leaving a substantial estate. Id. at 255. The estate was
not probated and the mother continued to manage the affairs of the family assets,
including a mercantile store and farm land. Id. When the family fell on hard times and
family assets were jeopardized, the oldest son agreed to take title to the store and farm in
order to avoid the loss of the property. Id. at 255-56. Mother and siblings continued to
live in the house, work on the family farm, and run the family business for another thirty
six years. Id. at 256. Finally, when the mother died, the eldest son repudiated his trust
and declared that he considered the property to be exclusively his. Id. In addressing the
issue of statute of limitations and laches, the court found that in such cases, the statute
does not begin to run until the beneficiaries have actual or constructive notice of
repudiation of the trust. Id. at 257. This was especially true because of the close familial
relations involved.
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Where a near relative is involved courts are less inclined to
find a repudiation. This is so because of the greater
likelihood that the beneficiaries have reposed confidence in
him; and also, they would have a natural reluctance to sue
him unless circumstances forced them to do so, . . . Under the
facts shown there wouldn't be anything strange or
unreasonable about the plaintiffs assuming, as they say they
did, that the defendant was holding the property for the family
until after the death of their mother, so that she would be
provided with a home; and that after her death, their father's
estate would be settled and each would receive his share.
These considerations together with the fact that some
members of the family remained in the property, make the
refusal of the trial court to apply laches against the plaintiffs
harmonize with reason.
Id. (emphasis added); See also Acott v. Tornlinson, 337 P.2d 720, 724 (Utah 1959). More
recently, the Utah Supreme Court clarified this doctrine in Snow v. Rudd. 2000 UT 20.
[W]here a trustee is sued by a beneficiary or claims a
violation of the trust, it constitutes an "exceptional
circumstance" calling for application of the discovery rule.
We have held that under certain "exceptional ctircumstances"
we will find that a rigid application of the statute of
limitations may be "irrational and unjust" and thus make the
discovery rule available. To determine when this is the case,
we apply a balancing test to weigh "the hardship imposed on
the claimant by the application of the statute of limitations
against any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the
passage of time." In the category of cases involving
beneficiaries' claims of trustee misconduct, we have, in
effect, already conducted this balancing test. In Acott and
Walker we found, in substance, that to not apply the
discovery rule would lead to unjust results because of the
close familial relationship involved. In such a situation, the
beneficiary will be less likely to question the motives of the
trustee and less likely to sue. Therefore, it is appropriate to
protect the interests of a beneficiary by applying the
discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations until the
beneficiary knows or should know of the alleged breach or
repudiation."
Snow, 2000 UT 20, ^[11 (internal quotation marks and citation^ omitted).

-26-

Early on in the instant case, while ruling on a motion for summary judgment based on
a statute of limitations theory, the District Court correctly noted that this case presents an
issue where the discovery rule might appropriately apply. (Record 259-260). Later, at
trial, the District Court appropriately found that the case at bar does in fact present all the
factual circumstances required to presumptively apply the discovery rule to toll the
statute of limitations: the parties are siblings, and the evidence strongly demonstrates that
both Arnold and each sibling reposed trust in Donald that he would hold the farm for the
benefit of the family. (See Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 48:20-25, 49:1-25, 50:1-25, 51:124, 52:21-25, 53:1-4, 60:8-12, 127:19-25, 128:1-3, 184:16-23, 191:2-18; Record 1459,
Trans. Vol. II, 224:2-5, 238:4-8, 333:1-25, 334:1-10, 335:23-25, 336:1-2, 381:4-15,
388:20-25, 389:1-5, 396:11-25; Record 1461, Trans. Vol. Ill, 420:10-20, 421:1-20,
430:11-21, 453:7-25, 454:1-7, 462:3-13; Trial Exhibits 19-29). Donald and Jeanette
produced no evidence at trial that the parties were not siblings, and almost no evidence
that the siblings did not repose trust in Donald and Jeanette. The District Court correctly
sided with the great weight of the evidence.
Because the discovery rule applies to the facts of this case, the only remaining
question is whether and when repudiation occurred.

In other words, when did the

siblings know, or when should they have known that Donald and Jeanette were no longer
going to honor their duties as trustees? When did Donald and Jeanette demonstrate that
they would treat the family farm as solely their own property?

In addressing this

question, the District Court made the following factual finding:
In 1993 Donald traded a property known as the Hellwell
property, shown as Exhibit [4]1, for 6.5 acres in Washington
County, Utah. It was only after Dwayne became aware of the
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Hellwell trade that Donald or his spouse, for the first time,
told any siblings they believed they owned the trust property,
and they were using the funds or income from the trust
property in any way they chose.
(Record 1561). In other words, repudiation of the trust did not occur until after Dwayne
knew of the Hellwell trade, and of Donald's intent on how he was planning to use the
traded property. Substantial evidence supports this factual I finding. Dwayne Rawlings
testified that he and the rest of the family learned of the Hellwell trade in the summer of
1993, a few months after it occurred. (Record 1461, Trans. Vol. II, 453:7-25, 454:1-7).
When the Hellwell trade was discovered by the siblings, it was generally understood that
the trade was done for the benefit of the family. (Record 1461, Trans. Vol. Ill 453:7-25,
454:1-7; Record 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 355:7-25, 356:1-25, 357:1-11). It was not until late
October or early November of 1993 that Dwayne finally learned of Donald's true
intentions. Dwayne testified that in late October or early November of 1993, he and
Donald had a conversation about the Hellwell trade.
A. . . . I asked him what he'd give Mother for compensation
for these two lots; and he told me he didn't give her anything.
It was his lot. I says, "What have you - - how did you
compensate Mother for the topsoil you've been taking off the
farm?" He says, "I didn't compensate her at all. It was my
property. It was my soil. I sold it, and put the money in my
account, and spent it any way I wanted to."
Then I said, "What about your brothers, your tliree brothers?"
I said, "Why don't you - -" after he told Hie it was his
property, I said, "Why don't you transfer a lot to each one of
your two brothers and sister?" I said, "That would really help
with the family relations." He said, "I'm not going to give
that blank, blank, blank Larell anything." I saio, "What about
Carol and Bryce?" "I'm not going to give them anything
either."
I finished up - - I told him at that time, I says, "I'll finish up
the job I'm working on," and I was doing most of the work
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for the business. "I'll finish up the jobs I'm doing, and I will
not do any more with you."
Q. Was that the reason?
A. That was the reason.
Q. That caused the break up of your business?
A. Yes.
The District Court specifically found that this was "the first time" that Donald
gave an indication to anyone that he would no longer hold for the benefit of the family,
and repudiated the trust. Furthermore, LaRell Rawlings testified that he had no notice
that Donald had begun to treat the family farm as his personal property until after this
action was initially filed by Donald. (Record 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 177:18-25, 178:1).
Three and a half years after Donald and Dwayne's conversation, on May 8, 1997,
Dwayne and his siblings filed a counterclaim against Donald alleging constructive trust.
(Record 23-28). Regardless of whether a four or a seven year statute of limitations
applies, Appellees filed a claim for constructive trust within the appropriate time period.
Interestingly, although both Donald and Jeanette took the stand at trial, neither
testified as to the repudiation of the trust. The Hellwell property was not mentioned in
their testimony; the 1993 conversation with Dwayne was not brought up. Donald and
Jeanette made no efforts to rebut the evidence and testimony regarding repudiation of the
trust. Naturally, the trial court followed the only evidence presented on repudiation, and
correctly found that Donald initially repudiated the trust in the fall of 1993. Therefore,
Appellees 1997 counterclaim for constructive trust was well within the statute of
limitations.
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V.

UTAH RULES AND STATUTES PERMIT A TRIAL COURT TO
IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON PARTIES THAT FAIL TO MEDIATE IN
GOOD FAITH, AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN IMPOSING SANCTIONS IN THIS CASE.
Contrary to Appellants' argument, the order imposing sanctions on Donald and

Jeanette Rawlings is authorized by statute, and is consistent #ith Rule 101(c) of the Utah
Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution. Rule 101(c) provides that a
mediation conference "should proceed in a fashion that furthers the goals of the
mediation process . . . and encourages candor on the part of participating parties." Rule
101(c) derives its authority and is based upon the policies outlined in the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-5(l). This statute states that "the
rules of the Judicial Council shall be based upon the purposes and provisions of this
[Alternative Dispute Resolution] act."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-31b-5(2).

Those

provisions provide for sanctions in the absence of good faith. Specifically the statute
authorizes the "imposition of sanctions for failure of counsel or parties to participate in
good faith in the ADR procedure assigned."

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-5(3)(p)

(emphasis added). Pursuant to these rules and statutes, the District Court correctly noted
that Rule 101(c) "requires good faith discussion, and whilej parties may terminate that
process, they may only do so after they have engaged in thd settlement process in good
faith." (Record 1405).
Although the standard of review for imposing sanctions under UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-3 lb-5 has never been addressed, the standard for review |br sanctions generally is an
abuse of discretion standard. See generally, Hess v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 213, ^[6 163
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P.3d 747. However, Donald and Jeanette have not challenged the factual finding by the
court that they failed to approach mediation in good faith, rather Donald and Jeanette
have raised the sole issue of whether sanctions for lack of good faith are ever appropriate
in a mediation setting. Therefore, what the standard of review should be for a District
Court's factual finding of a lack of good faith under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 lb-5 is not
properly before the Court. Donald and Jeanette have only raised the purely legal question
of whether sanctions can be imposed on a party who fails to enter the mediation process
in good faith. Because the finding of bad faith by the District Court has not been
challenged, as long as UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3lb-5 requires parties to come in good
faith, the imposition of sanctions was proper in this case.
In the Order Granting Motion for Sanctions, for Payment of Mediator's Fees, and
for Attorney's Fees of Opposing Counsel, the District Court imposed sanctions on
Donald and Jeanette Rawlings after finding that they "came to the mediation with a fully
formed intention not to participate in the mediation in good faith and had determined that
they would not be prepared to discuss all relevant issues in this case." (Record 1401).
Donald and Jeanette have attempted to characterize the District Court's rule as an
imposition on the parties for failure to be "reasonable" and as a requirement that the
parties take particular positions. While it may be true that a court cannot require parties
in mediation to take a particular position, the District Court did not do this. The District
Court only required that the parties be prepared to discuss all issues in good faith,
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-5(3)(p) and Rule 101(c) of the Utah Rules of
Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution.

The District Court determined that

Donald and Jeanette did not approach mediation in good faith, and exercised its
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marshaling the evidence. Because this case involves familial relations and constructive
trust, the discovery rule exception to the statute of limitations presumptively applies.
Because the discovery rule applies, the only remaining question was whether and when
did the beneficiaries of the trust had notice of repudiation. The District Court properly
found, based on uncontroverted evidence, that Donald initially gave notice of repudiation
in the fall of 1993 in a conversation with Dwayne. Appellees brought a claim for
constructive trust three and a half years later, well withiii any applicable statute of
limitations. Therefore, Appellants arguments regarding the statute of limitations fail.
Finally, Utah rules and statutes permit a trial court to impose sanctions on parties
that fail to mediate in good faith. In the present case the trial court properly found a lack
of good faith on the part of Donald and Jeanette, and appropriately used its discretion to
impose sanctions on Appellants.
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discretion to impose sanctions, pursuant to the statute.

No particular position was

mentioned or required; no subjective "reasonableness" standard was applied. Therefore,
pursuant to Rule 101(c) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3lb-5 the District Court properly
imposed sanctions based on Appellants lack of good faith.
CONCLUSION
The standard of review for all findings of fact, regardless of the burden of proof at
the trial court level, is a clearly erroneous standard. The 'clearly preponderates' standard
is based on cases that are no longer good law and the standard is no longer applicable in
Utah. Although Appellant's have challenged the trial court's findings of a confidential
relationship, Appellants have failed to meet their burden of marshalling the evidence in
the record to support the District Court's findings. That failure alone is sufficient to rule
against the Appellants. Moreover, independent documentation indicates that after the
1967 transfer of the family farm to Donald and Jeanette, Arnold continued to work the
farm and refer to it as his own property. After his death, the family continued to work the
farm and treat it as a family asset. The family reposed trust in Donald and Jeanette and it
was understood that he was holding the farm for the benefit of the family. The trial court
properly imposed a constructive trust.

Moreover, neither the trial court nor the

Appellees limited themselves to a finding of a constructive trust based only on a
confidential relationship. The existence of a confidential relationship is not required in
order to properly impose a constructive trust, and the evidence properly supports the
imposition of a constructive trust under alternate theories not raised in this appeal.
Appellants also argue that the statute of limitations was not properly applied to the facts
of this case, but in doing so Appellants have again failed to meet their burden of
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